Pennsylvania Supreme Court Redefines “Operation” for Vehicle Liability Exception to Governmental Immunity (PA)

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently issued a decision that will make it easier to file a lawsuit against state government agencies involved in car accidents. In Balentine v Chester Water Authority, the Court considered whether the involuntary movement of a vehicle constitutes an operation of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1).

A lawsuit was brought by Victoria Balentine, the widow of Edwin Omar Medina-Flores (“Medina-Flores”), against Chester Water Authority (“CWA”), Charles Mathues (“Mathues”), Wyatt Roland, and Michael Roland. Medina-Flores was a contractor for Metra Industries, which was hired by CWA to rehabilitate a section of its water distribution system. The project encompassed cleaning and lining water mains, including one located on Kerlin Street in Chester, Pennsylvania.

On August 15, 2012, Medina-Flores was working inside of a ditch located near the 1200 block of Kerlin Street. An inspector for CWA, Mathues, parked his CWA vehicle approximately ten to fifteen feet away from the ditch with a portion of the vehicle protruding into the road. At the time, the CWA vehicle’s engine was still running as Mathues stood outside of it. Soon thereafter, another vehicle struck the CWA vehicle, causing it to hit Medina-Flores and pin him inside of the ditch.

Initially, the trial court granted CWA’s motion for summary judgment after determining that the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity set forth in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act did not apply. Rather, the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity would apply only if such a vehicle was considered “in operation.” As such, a person had to be in the act of driving or moving the vehicle in order for liability to attach. On appeal, a divided Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court and stated that precedential case law which addressed whether involuntary movement of a vehicle constituted operation for purposes of the governmental immunity exception did not exist. As such, this was an issue of first impression.

Thereafter, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted discretionary review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court erred in affirming the appeal. In so doing, the Court focused on the fundamental question regarding the relationship between “motion” and “operation.” The language in the statute states that the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity refers only to “operation” and not to “motion.” However, numerous Pennsylvania cases have muddied the definition to require that a vehicle also be in motion.

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined that “operation” did not mean to simply move forward or backwards but also included the decision-making process that is attendant to moving the vehicle. The Court noted that if the legislature intended that recovery was only permissible when the vehicle was in motion, the legislature would not have utilized a word that implies process within the statute. As such, the requirement of motion was never an element of the statute.

Ultimately, the Court held that the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity applied in this case. The Court stated that “[w]here a government vehicle obstructs a roadway, in whole or in part, we can assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that a government agent operated the vehicle to arrive at that position.” According to the Court, this redefinition of “operation” provides a reasonable standard that comports with the intent of the legislature and does not add the unnecessary requirement of motion. As a result, the order of the Commonwealth Court was reversed and remanded.

Thanks to Zhanna Dubinsky for her contribution to this post. Please email Vito A. Pinto with any questions.