When Officer Robert Barth was dispatched to the Brookhaven Swim Club on November 12, 2012, he found a man lying face down in a gravel parking lot. Officer Barth asked the surrounding crowd for information on the man (later identified as Joshua Anthony Belknap) and began to check vital signs. Two members of the crowd, who later identified themselves as Belknap’s friends, stated that they believed Belknap had overdosed on heroin. Officer Barth administered a sternum rub to Belknap’s chest as a means of resuscitation. When that failed, Officer Barth proceeded to look for identification in Belknap’s pockets. Officer Barth found a needle with an orange cap in Belknap’s right pocket. Belknap was subsequently arrested and charged with one count of possession of drug paraphernalia.

At trial, the prosecution used Officer Barth’s testimony to convict Belknap. Although Belknap’s counsel objected to Officer Barth’s testimony as hearsay (meaning an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted), the trial court judge overruled the objection. The trial court concluded that Officer Barth’s testimony was admissible under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule (Pa.R.E. 803(4)). This exception permits the admission of an out-of-court statement made for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment.

On appeal, Belknap argued that the medical treatment exception is limited to out-of-court statements made to physicians and nurses. He argued that the statements made to Officer Barth “had little impact on the course of action he took when he arrived on location.” Appellant’s Brief, 16.

However, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania disagreed. The court ruled that Officer Barth’s testimony fell squarely within the bounds of the exception. First, the statements determined how Office Barth would proceed with his resuscitation attempts. Officer Barth was a veteran police officer and was trained in the practice of resuscitating victims, including victims suffering from drug overdoses. The statements of Belknap’s friends were made for the sole purpose of obtaining medical treatment or diagnosis, as it required by the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.

Similarly, the statements were intrinsically reliable. The medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule is based in the fact that a declarant will be motivated to tell the truth when he knows his statements are being used for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment. In this case, Belknap’s friends were likely eager to provide Officer Barth with the information necessary to facilitate proper resuscitation protocol.

The court noted that nothing in the medical treatment exception language limited the exception to statements made to licensed medical professions, such as physicians or nurses. In fact, the court interpreted the exception broadly, stating that the exception also encompassed statements about causation.

Although the medical treatment hearsay exception is well-established in Pennsylvania case law, this recent opinion delineates its boundaries. Now, we know that the exception applies to: (1) statements made to parties other than physicians and nurses; and (2) statements made by a person other than the patient, himself.  Thanks to Erica Woebse for her contribution to this post, and please email Brian Gibbons with any questions.